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the will, taxpayer was under no obligation to sell the entire block of stock
at one time, but could retain the stock or sell it in parts over a period of
time to avoid the depression in the market. The court then defined "actual market value" as used in the pertinent inheritance tax statute22 and
stated that it would not include a forced sale of an entire block of stock.
In reversing the lower courts and finding against the taxpayer, the court
concluded that the blockage rule should be generally disallowed and that
the shares in question should be valued in the usual course as of date of
death without consideration of the size of the particular block of stock.
In its opinion, the court made reference to the blockage principal applied
by some federal courts in determining federal estate or gift tax and dedined to follow them.
FRID SIEGEL

TORTS
PURVEYORS OF GOODS AND SERVICES

Supermarkets
Three cases reported during the survey period concern the duty of
supermarket owners to their patrons for unlawful detention, or injuries
received while on the premises. In Isaiah v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Company,1 a case decided under the Ohio "shoplifters statute," the
Summit County Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court ruling that a
store owner is liable for false imprisonment where his restraining action
was not justified by a showing of probable cause that the customer was
shoplifting. Under the statute, detention is authorized only where the
person has manifested an intent to steal. In affirming the Ohio rule that
the burden of proof of justification is on him who seeks to escape liability for false arrest, the court charged that the defendant must establish
by the weight of the evidence, probable cause for his conduct!
A second case involved injuries occasioned by a defect in an adjacent
parking area, and the proprietor's continuing duty of inspection to assure
the safe condition of the premises for all invitees. McClain v. Kroger
Company4 involved the action by a shopper for injuries sustained when
she came in contact with a three-inch wooden splinter projecting from a

guardrail in defendant's parking area. In reversing a verdict for plaintiff, the reviewing court held that where the evidence showed that the
manager had inspected the lot both before and after the accident, the
22.

OHIo REv. CODE § 5731.02 (Supp. 1961).
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burden was upon the plaintiff to prove that the splinter was in existence
at the time of the inspection. The Ohio rule is that the proprietor has a
continuing duty of inspection.5 However, where it is shown that he has
exercised reasonable and ordinary care to discharge this duty, the burden
is on the plaintiff to prove neglect in: (1) that the nature of the splinter
constituted a potential hazard, (2) the hazard was created by the negligent act of the defendant, and (3) defendant had or should have had
notice of the hazard in time to warn its customers of its presence.' Since
plaintiff had failed to prove the splinter's existence at the time of the
inspection, the jury should have been precluded from receiving evidence
based entirely on inference adduced from another unsupported inference.'
The final case in this area, McCormick v. Pick-N-Pay Supermarkets,8
concerns the liability of the supermarket for injuries sustained by customers within the store. Plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained
when a stack of soft drink cartons collapsed, severely injuring her foot.
In reversing a directed verdict for defendant, the reviewing court found
the defendant's employees might reasonably have foreseen the potential
danger to customers from cartons stacked in an unstable condition. Since
the question of falling merchandise is one of first impression in Ohio, it
will be interesting to see if Ohio will follow the "foreseeabiity rule" in
these situations as indicated by the court in this case, or whether "res ipsa"
will be applied.9

Remote Purchaser v.Manufacturer
The Ohio position with regard to the basis of liability of a manufacturer to a remote purchaser for the sale of inherently dangerous products
was reaffirmed in Kennedy v.General Beauty Products, Inc."° The court
in upholding the Wood doctrine" stated that where a remote purchaser
1. 174 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
2. OHIo REV. CODE S 2935.041.
3. See Reinhard v. City of Columbus, 49 Ohio St. 257, 31 N.E. 35 (1892).
4. 175 N.E.2d 199 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
5. 39 OHio JuR. Neglgence § 26 (1959).
6. Anaple v. Standard Oil Co., 162 Ohio St. 537, 124 N.E.2d 128 (1955).
7. The jury should not have been allowed to infer the existence of the splinter without any
proof of its existence at the time of inspection. Secondly, the inference of lack of due care
in inspection cannot be inferred from the fact that the splinter was not found at the time of
inspection. 175 N.E.2d 199, 200 (Ohio Cr. App. 1961).
8. 170 N.E.2d 491 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
9. See Leone v. Safeway Stores Inc., 133 N.J.L. 478, 44 A.2d 913 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Robinson v. A & P Tea Co., 184 Misc., 571, 54 N.Y.S.2d 42 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1945).
10. 112 Ohio App. 505, 167 N.E.2d 116 (1960).
11. Wood v. General Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953). See also Rogers
v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958). F-
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is injured through the use of an inherently dangerous product, such as a
hair dye, his cause of action is limited to one for breach of an express
warranty or negligence because of the absence of privity between the
parties, rather than for breach of implied warranty.
Paying Guest v. Charitable Organization
Bell v. Salvation Army' raised the question of the extension of the
Avellone 8 doctrine to non-hospital charitable organizations. The Ohio
Supreme Court, in reversing a judgment for the defendant on the pleadings, declared that a cause of action is stated against a charitable organization where the injury resulted from an activity conducted by the organization for profit and not directly related to its charitable purpose. Since
the petition alleged the injured party had paid value for the defendant's
services, the court determined that the plaintiff was not precluded by the
charitable immunity doctrine and could recover under the exception to
the immunity rule. Earlier in the year a court of appeals held that a tuition paying college student was still a "beneficiary" of a non-profit religious educational institution and therefore was barred from recovery
under the charitable immunity rule. 4
Duty of Repairmen and LandownersApplication of Res Ipsa Loquitur
Repairmen
Two cases in the area of goods and services involve the liabilities of
repairmen for damages either to the plaintiff's goods or to his premises
which were caused by fire. The first, Ohio Casualty Insurance Company
v. Mariemont Garage, Inc.,'" held that the duty of redelivery is not
avoided by the defense that the bailor's car was destroyed by fire unless
the bailee can further show himself free of negligence in the loss.
The second case, Schafer v. Wells,"0 which was decided in the Ohio
Supreme Court, involved an unusual application of the res ipsa doctrine.
In this action the owner-plaintiff sought relief from the defendant-repair,
man for damages occasioned to his premises by the explosiin and fire
from an alleged defective stove installed by the defendant. The plaintiff
12. 172 Ohio St. 326, 175 N.E.2d 738 (1961).
13. Avellone v. St. Johns Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956). See also
Gibbon v. Y.W.C.A., 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960), -wherein the Avellone doctrine was held not to apply to the Y.W.C.A. See Recent Decision, 11 WEST. R1S. L. REV.
680 (1960).
14. Mathews v. Wittenberg College, 113 Ohio App. 387, 172 N.E.2d 726 (1960)
15. 175 NY..2d 749 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
16. 171 Ohio St. 506, 172 N.E.2d 708 (1961).
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offered evidence which tended to prove that: (1) the burner had been
installed by the defendant, (2) he and his brother had ignited it for a
test, and (3) no one had entered the furnace room from the time defendants left until the fire was discovered an hour and one-half later. The
effect was to establish that the instrumentality was in the custody and
control of the defendant, and that in the ordinary course of events this
type of accident would not occur. Although the trial court was reversed
by the court of appeals on the issue of "exclusive control," the supreme
court reinstated the verdict on the reasoning that the use of the word
"ordinary" indicated that the control need not be continuous and uninterrupted to the moment of the injury, but only that the plaintiff need
show that there was no intervening control by a third person or himself.

Landowners
Another application of the res ipsa rule was found in Joyce v. Union
"
Here plaintiff, an employee of an
Carbide and Carbon Corporation.'
independent contractor, was severely burned when molten ashes erupted
through an open fly ash door from a boiler located within defendant's
plant. In reversing a directed verdict for the defendant, the Cuyahoga
County Court of Appeals held that Joyce was an invitee and that since
defendant retained control over the premises, he owed plaintiff a duty to
warn of any hazardous condition which was not obvious. In arriving at
its holding, the court distinguished previous Ohio cases which have denied
liability for injuries received while engaged in hazardous work. 8

LEGO-MEDICAL

A previous survey article expressed concern over the growing number
of medical malpractice cases arising in this jurisdiction.19 If society is to
achieve a superior level of medical care, it must afford the medical practitioner a broader degree of immunity in practicing his art. There are,
however, instances which raise the question of whether the medical profession is living up to its responsibilities.
One such case is Koubeck v. Fairview Park Hospital.2" Plaintiff in
this action was treated in defendant's emergency room for injuries to his
knee sustained in a fall into an evergreen tree. Treatment was rendered
by a foreign resident employed by the defendant-hospital and who at the
17.
18.
19.
20.

173 N.E.2d 692 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
Id. at 697.
Smith, Survey of Ohio Law - Torts, 12 WEST. RES. L. REV. 564 (1961).
172 N.E.2d 491 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
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time of his entry in the United States some three years before "knew no
words of English." Plaintiff complained of pain in the knee and told of
removing a branch from it after the fall. The defendant-physician took
X-rays and probed the wound, but finding nothing, he sutured it and released the patient. Subsequent swellings and inflammation of the joint
necessitated removal of a splinter and surgery which resulted in fusing
the joint.
Testimony offered during the trial affirmed that the splinter should
not have been overlooked if the probe of the knee had been conducted
with ordinary care. This splinter was not produced at the trial because
it had been destroyed by one of the physicians before the trial began.
The court of appeals in sustaining a jury verdict for the plaintiff held
that the hospital, a non-profit corporation, could be liable for the negligence of one of its resident doctors.21 The obvious question still unanswered is the liability of a hospital for the negligent acts of medical
personnel where the hospital has no authority or control over their professional conduct.22
A second lego-medical question, whether a hospital may be compelled
to provide a former patient with access to all records of her confinement,
was the gist of the action in Wallace v. University Hospitals of Cleveland.2" A final answer by the supreme court was rendered impossible
when the defendant, in compliance with an order of the common pleas
court, provided the plaintiff with a photostatic copy of the desired records.
The supreme court, obviously concerned with this procedure, dismissed
the case as moot, although acknowledging that other jurisdictions have
retained such cases on the ground that the case presents a question of
great public interest. The general rule is that a hospital must permit a
former patient to see his hospital records only if the hospital deems the
inspection to be of benefit to the patient.2 4 Therefore, the question of
who decides which records are of benefit to the patient must remain unanswered in a case such as this where the hospital in fact permitted the
patient to see the records.
21. This is not the first time that the liability of a non-profit hospital for the negligent acts
of its resident employees has been raised. Nor is it the first reported case of unnoticed objects
in puncture wounds. See Rush v. Akron Gen. Hosp., 171 N.E.2d 378 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
22. The most serious facet of a case of this kind is the apparent compromise of medical competence under the "exchange visitor program." Although this program has afforded many
foreign national residents the opportunity to study our more advanced methods of treatment,
it would seem that the interests of the public require that hospitals assure emergency as well
as all other patients that they may rely on the skill and training of those whom the hospital
selects to minister to their needs. In addition, before the medical profession is given the
authority to pass on its own cases of alleged malpractice it would seem that there must be
some binding assurance that all evidence will be preserved for future deliberations.
23. 171 Ohio St.487, 172 NE.2d 459 (1961).
24. Id. at 488, 172 N.E.2d 459 (1961).
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TRADITIONAL TORT AREAS

Causal Relationship
The famous "bug bite" case, Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Company,25 which produced one of the largest verdicts in the history of
Cuyahoga County, was reversed on appeal because the claim of causation
was too tenuous upon which to base the defendant's liability. The action
arose under the FELA2 6 from an insect bite which the plaintiff received
while employed as a foreman in the defendant's Cleveland yard. Plaintiff's contention was that the insect probably came from a vermin-infested pool adjacent to the portion of the tracks where he and his crew
were assigned to work. In reversing the lower court's verdict, the appellate court noted that there was no direct evidence offered which would
tend to prove that the existence of the unidentified bug had any connection with the infected pool, only a series of guesses and speculation.
In another case involving the question of causal relationship, Barnett
v. Sun Oil Company," the Hamilton County Court of Appeals reaffirmed
Ohio's position with respect to the "physical impact" doctrine. Here recovery was denied the representative of a woman who died of hypertension while trying to escape a conflagration in front of her home caused
by the upsetting of defendant's loaded tanker truck. The court in following Miller v. Baltimore & South Western Railway Company" held that
in an action involving ordinary negligence there is no liability for fright
or its consequences where it is unaccompanied by physical injury.29
In the final case"9 in this area during the past year the supreme court
in an able opinion by Justice Taft dismissed, due to remoteness of causation, the claim of an engineer that the presence of a defective brake beam,
in violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 1 was the proximate
cause of an injury sustained when he alighted from his engine some fortyfive minutes after it had been halted for repairs. In his opinion, Judge
Taft again raised objection to the application of the federal "split-scintilla" rule in cases where it is obvious the claimant elected to bring his
action in the state court to avail himself of procedural advantages.
25. 173 N.E.2d 382 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 172 Ohio St. 488, 178 N.E.2d
597 (1961), cert. granted, 30 U.S.L. WEEK, 3323 (U.S. April 17, 1962) (No. 765).
26. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1959).
27. 113 Ohio App. 449, 172 N.E.2d 734 (1961).
28. 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908).
29. Query, what if the plaintiff in the instant case had claimed physical injury from the
inhalation of smoke? See Battalla v. State, 21 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 929 (1961), wherein the New York Court of Appeals reversed that state's position held since 1896. See also
Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930), where the court held that coughing
was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of physical injury.
30. Reed v. Pennsylvania Ry., 171 Ohio St. 433, 171 N.E.2d 718 (1961).
31. 36 Stat. 298 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 1-43 (1959).
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Discovered Peril
In Freeman v. New York Central Railroad Company,8 2 the court was
faced with an attempted application of the doctrine of "discovered peril."
The plaintiff, a trespasser on defendant's railroad yard, who by his own
admission was in such an intoxicated condition that "he was unable to
exercise his facilities of reasoning and judgment," was struck by defendant's train. Plaintiff claimed that defendant had knowledge that the
plaintiff was on its tracks and in a condition which prevented him from
removing himself. Following a jury verdict for plaintiff, the court entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict which was affirmed on the
ground that the plaintiff had not exercised ordinary care for his own
safety up to and including the time of the accident.
Contributory Negligence v. Assumption of Risk
An analysis of the cases touching the issue of contributory negligence
produces some thoughtful consideration on the use of the doctrine. It
will serve the pleader well to remember the distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of risk. The two are not synonymous;
contributory negligence is based on carelessness, assumption of risk reThus where there is due care on the part of the
flects venturousness.3
plaintiff the court may not rule as a matter of law that he is guilty of contributory negligence. 4 Since contributory negligence is an affirmative
defense and a complete bar to recovery, it is reversable error to charge
the jury on it if it has not been pleaded or proven. 5
The use of assumption of risk as an affirmative defense is illustrated
by two cases reported in 1961. In Holm v. American ShipbuildingCompany" plaintiff was denied recovery where it was shown he had knowledge of the slippery condition of the gangplank prior either to his walking on it or falling from it. In Bates v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Company 7 the plaintiffs had knowledge of the dangerous nature of the
work and were precluded from claiming otherwise in their attempted
recovery under the "frequenter" statutes3 8
These cases illustrate only a small portion of the problem. Society
seeks to encourage a high standard of care, on the one hand, while allowing compensation for the injured party and his family on the other. Cer32.

112 Ohio App. 395, 174 N.E.2d 750 (1960).

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

PROSSER, TORTS 304-05 (2d ed. 1955).
Truer v. New York Central Ry., 112 Ohio App. 418, 176 NXE.2d 276 (1960).
Grande v. Erie Ry., 172 N.E.2d 161 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
276 F.2d. 201 (6th Cir. 1960).
171 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio Cr. App. 1961).
OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4101.01, 4101.11-.12.
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tainly, in other areas of tort law courts have recognized that more than
the rights of the actual parties are involved in any legal proceeding."9
Joint Enterprise
A joint enterprise has been defined by the supreme court as "the
joint prosecution of a common purpose under such circumstances that
each member of such enterprise has the authority to act for all in respect
to the control of the agencies employed to execute such common purpose." 4 In Vonderheide v. Comerford4 the question was presented as
to whether three employees of the city who were working together were
engaged in a joint enterprise so that a mutual agency was established.
Citing Judge Taft's opinion in Parton v. Weilnau,42 the court felt it unreasonable to impose liability upon a co-worker for the negligence of a
fellow worker where there is no choice as to co-employees and they are
engaged in a duty owed to a common employer.
INJURIES SUSTAINED WHILE RIDING IN MOTOR VEHICLES

Assured Clear Distance
In Woods v. Brown's Bakery,4" the supreme court had before it the
Ohio assured-clear-distance statute. 4 The case arose over the collision of
two vehicles at a fog-blanketed intersection. Although "under ordinary
circumstances" the rule has no application to intersection cases, the court
ruled it does where the visibility of the drivers is obscured by fog. The
effect of this decision was to bar plaintiff's recovery because he had approached the intersection at a speed which did not permit him to stop
within the assured clear distance when the defendant's truck suddenly
loomed in front of him. The application of the rule seems to favor a
driver who has proceeded through a stop sign, but, as the courts have
pointed out, this is a harsh and arbitrary rule which must be enforced
until the legislature amends or repeals the statute.
In Gordon v.Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Company45 a driver
sought to avoid the harshness of the assured clear distance rule by pleading that he was blinded by the back-up lights of the truck which he struck
39. In Videtto v. Marsh, 112 Ohio App. 151, 175 N.E.2d 764 (1960), the court held that
a father was not barred in an action to recover medical expenses for his son's injuries by the
fact that the defendant had been judicially determined non-negligent in the prior tort action
by the son. See discussion in Recent Decision, p. 600 intra.
40. Bloom v. Leech, 120 Ohio St. 239, 166 N.E. 137 (1929).
41. 113 Ohio App. 284, 177 N.E.2d 793 (1961).
42. 112 Ohio App. 480, 176 N.E.2d 299 (1960).
43. 171 Ohio St. 383, 171 N.E.2d 496 (1960).
44. OHIo REV. CODE § 4511.21.
45. 112 Ohio App. 218, 173 N.E.2d 720 (1960).
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from the rear. The court was unsympathetic. It would seem that the
only way to avoid the operation of the rule in a factual situation calling
for its application is for the court to forget to charge the jury on the rule.
In such a case the error is one of omission, not commission, and therefore
not usually grounds for reversal 4 6
Vehicle Ownership and Control
Two reported cases point up the lengths courts will go to avoid attaching liability to the owners of automobiles who are not themselves
personally involved in the accident. The first of these, Florita v. Back,""
involved the use of the owner's truck and trailer under conditions which
the plaintiff claimed satisfied the requirements of the statute imposing
liability on owners of motor vehicles which they are not actually driving4 The court dismissed the action as to the owner on the ground that
it was not shown he had knowingly permitted the trucks to be used by
4 9 held that the mere alhis brother. The second case, Tonti v. Paglia,
legation of negligent entrustment of a vehicle by a mother to her minor
son does not state a cause of action against such parent-owner for subsequent injuries to a passenger occasioned by the minor's use of the vehicle
Since the passenger was within the guest statute, the owner's duty was
only to be free of willful or wanton conduct causing injury to the
passenger.
Guest Statute
The Ohio Guest Statute,5" described by some as the most anti-social
piece of legislation currently on the statute books, is usually the basis for
several "'hard" decisions each year. The only parties who did not feel its
effect are those who proved they were paying passengers.
In two cases reported during the survey period, plaintiffs have been
able to recover despite the fact they were injured while riding in automobiles driven by members of their own family. In Henline v. Wilson"'
the court ruled that the mere status of family relationship of the occupants does not raise a presumption either for or against the proposition
that the relative-passenger is a guest. In Campbell v. Marquis" the Jack46. Hipp v. Williams, 113 Ohio App. 473 (1961).
, 47. 112 Ohio App. 480, 176 N.E.2d 299 (1960).
48. Ohio Revised Code section 4513.02 states in part: 'No person shall drive or move, or
cause or knowingly permit to be driven or moved, on any highway any vehicle or combination
of vehicles which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person ...
49. 171 Ohio St. 520, 172 N.E.2d 914 (1961).
50. OHIO REv. CODE § 4515.02.
51. 111 Ohio App. 515, 174 N.E.2d 122 (1960).
52. 112 Ohio App. 50, 175 N.X.2d 106 (1960).

